中国的萨拉菲主义以及与沙特阿拉伯的联系

本文系日本外交学者网The Diplomat于2014年10月23日发布的深度研究报道Chinese Salafism and the Saudi Connection,作者:穆罕穆德·苏得里(Mohammed Al-Sudairi),译者:洪漫,译文来源:《参考资料》。

本文为方便中英文翻译爱好者学习整理而成,原文地址参见文章结尾处。

@习五一:一位世界宗教研究所的学者告诉我,中国穆斯林与萨拉菲主义的关系是十分敏感的议题。本文概述中国的萨拉菲主义与沙特阿拉伯的关系。当代中国回族穆斯林的萨拉菲化,值得关注。

@中科大胡不归:沙特花费大量资金在中国各地建造清真寺,促成回族穆斯林社区的沙特正统化。新一代谋求参与政治渠道。

@寞洑:文章比较有趣的地方,是讲中国的回族如何走上阿拉伯化道路,如何走上在文化和宗教上承认沙特为正统的道路。萨拉菲主义是沙特和ISIS秉承的理念。

萨拉菲主义,即中国所熟知的瓦哈比主义,以其“缔造者”穆罕默德•本•阿卜杜勒•瓦哈比命名。文中译注部分所出现的“本刊”指《参考消息》。以下为正文:

Salafism, or Salafiyya, is a doctrinal-intellectual current within Islam that espouses a return to the ways of the Salaf As-Salih (the Pious Ancestors), the first three generations of Muslims who lived during and after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Often described as being rooted in the works of the medieval scholars Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah, Salafism seeks to establish a more “authentic” religious experience predicated on a presumably correct reading of the Quran and the sunnah (the sayings and practices of the Prophet) and away from the supposedbid’ah (innovations) and heretical practices that have “polluted” it.

萨拉菲主义是伊斯兰教的一个教义—学术思潮,拥护回归到虔诚先辈(在先知穆罕默德去世前后生活的头3代穆斯林)的方式。萨拉菲主义经常被描述为植根于中世纪学者伊本罕百里和伊本泰米叶的作品之中,它寻求建立更“正宗”的宗教经验,而其前提是正确阅读《古兰经》和圣训(先知的说法和做法),远离假想的异端(创新)和“污染”宗教的异端做法。

This current moreover embraces to a certain extent a rejection of the madhhab (legal school) Sunni traditions that had emerged in Islam’s early centuries. As a relatively modern phenomenon building on the Sunni orthodox revivals of the 18th century, the failures of traditional Muslim authorities to contend with mounting internal and external challenges, as well as the spread of new modernistic discourses, Salafism found a popular following across many Muslim societies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its growth was facilitated by Saudi Arabia – which embraced its own idiosyncratic brand of Salafism rooted in the mid-18th century religious revivalism that swept central Arabia (usually denoted by its detractors as Wahhabism after its “founder” Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab) – especially after its annexation of Mecca and Medina in 1924-25, and the subsequent influx of oil wealth, which endowed the country with the religious authority and means (universities, charities, organizations, preachers, and communicative mediums) to promote this current globally.

这一思潮在一定程度上接受抵制在伊斯兰教早期世纪出现的(法律学派)逊尼派传统。在19世纪末20世纪初,由于传统的穆斯林当局未能抗衡内外部出现的挑战,再加上新的现代性话语的传播,萨拉菲主义在许多穆斯林社会受到欢迎。沙特阿拉伯为其发展提供了便利。沙特接受自己特质品牌的萨拉菲主义,它植根于18世纪中叶席卷阿拉伯半岛中部的宗教复兴运动(通常被其批评者称为瓦哈比主义,以其“缔造者”穆罕默德本阿卜杜勒瓦哈比命名),尤其是在沙特在1924年至1925年吞并麦加和麦地那,以及随后坐拥石油财富之后。石油赋予这个国家宗教权威和手段(大学、慈善机构、组织、宣讲员和交际媒介),从而将这一思潮推向全球。

Among China’s Hui ethnic group, Saudi-influenced Salafism has been present for nearly a century. Aside from the intellectual residue influencing other sects and currents, its most obvious manifestation is to be found in the Salafi sect, which constitutes a small minority within the community of the faithful in China. Concentrated in small clusters across the Northwest and Yunnan, and identified by their “Saudi” clothes, Salafis have elicited fear and opposition from their ideological opponents within the wider Chinese Muslim community, leading at times to outright sectarian conflict.

沙特萨拉菲主义在中国回族中的影响已经存在了近一个世纪。萨拉菲派在中国的伊斯兰教派中占据少数,他们主要集中在西北和云南,人数很少,可以从他们的“沙特”服饰中看得出来。萨拉菲派已经在更广泛的中国穆斯林社区中的意识形态对手中引发了恐惧和反对,时常导致彻底的教派冲突。

Since the 1990s, and particularly following 9/11, the Chinese state has placed the Salafi community under close surveillance, fearing that its close connections with Saudi Arabia as well as presumed Uighur Salafi networks, not to mention the sect’s considerable growth over the past few years (attracting not only other Hui, but increasingly Han as well), might herald political and religious violence in the future. These security concerns have only abounded with the rising specter of the Islamic State and the appearance of a few Chinese fighters in the ranks of the contending Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq.

自上个世纪90年代以来,特别是在“911”恐怖袭击之后,中国一直担心本国萨拉菲社区与沙特以及据推测维吾尔族萨拉菲网络有着紧密联系,更何况该教派在过去5年间人数大幅增长(不仅吸引其他回族,而且还越来越吸引汉族),这可能预示着未来的政治和宗教暴力事件。随着“伊斯兰国”组织幽灵的崛起,再加上几名中国武装人员出现在叙利亚和伊拉克的伊斯兰集团队伍中,这些安全关切与日俱增。

Historical Roots of Chinese Salafism

中国萨拉菲主义的历史根源

Although relatively isolated since the 14th century with the disintegration of the Yuan dynasty, the Hui Muslim communities, and especially those in the Northwest of China, remained open to the religious and intellectual influences emanating from other parts of the Muslim world. The spread of the various Sufi tariqas (orders),such as the Naqshibandis, Kubrawis, and Qadiris, during the late Ming and early Qing in China in the 17th century, as well as the consolidation of Sufi tariqas with their own distinct lineages, tombs and practices (such as the Khuffiyya and Jahriyya), is indicative of this permeability, which endured primarily through the Hajj and overland trade networks via Central Asia and Yunnan. Unsurprisingly, the transmission of Salafism – or initially Wahhabi ideas – amongst the Hui follows this template in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

自14世纪元朝解体以来,回族穆斯林社区,尤其是中国西北部的回族穆斯林社区虽然相对孤立,但仍然对源自伊斯兰世界其他地方的宗教和思想影响保持开放的态度。在17世纪的明末清初,各种苏菲派(伊斯兰各种神秘主义派别的总称——本刊注)“道乘”(泛指伊斯兰寻道者在导师指引下修炼过程——本刊注),如纳黑希班底教派等,得以传播,再加上苏菲派“道乘”巩固了自己不同的谱系、墓葬和惯例(如虎非耶派的“隐没”以及“哲合忍耶”等),都表明了这种渗透性,这主要是通过朝觐,并通过中亚和云南的陆路贸易网络来传播。不出所料,在19世纪末20世纪初,萨拉菲主义——或者最初的瓦哈比理念——在回族中的传播遵循的就是这个模式。

Wahhabism gained converts in China throughout the Republican era, primarily as a byproduct of the growing traffic of Muslim pilgrims going to the Hejaz, facilitated by the proliferation of new means of transportation such as the steamship. Between 1923 and 1934, hundreds of Hui Muslims made the Hajj. In 1937 – prior to the full-fledged Japanese invasion of the country – well over 170 Hui reportedly boarded a steamer in Shanghai bound for Mecca. The effects of this were palpable, ranging from a noticeable increase in the availability of Wahhabi literature across China in the 1930s, as observed by the scholar Ma Tong, to high-profile conversions of detractors of the movement, including Sufi Sheiks.

在共和时代,瓦哈比主义在中国赢得了信徒,这主要是穆斯林去沙特汉志地区朝觐的交通发展的副产品,而这要归功于轮船等交通手段的大阔步发展。在1923年至1934年,数百名回族穆斯林进行了朝觐。1937年,也就是在日本全面入侵中国之前,据报道超过170名回族在上海登上了驶往麦加的轮船。这样做的效果是显而易见的。正如回族学者马通所说,在上个世纪30年代,中国的瓦哈比文学显著增加。再加上,反对这一运动的人中也有人高调皈依。

It is from within this context that the first pronounced Salafiyya sect emerged within China and mostly, interestingly enough, in reaction to the perceived “departure” of the Yihewani movement from its puritan and proto-Wahhabi ethos. The founding propagator of an explicit Salafism is usually identified as Ma Debao (1867-1977), originally a Yihewani adherent who officiated in various mosques across the Northwest. His earliest encounters with Salafism came through a visiting – presumably Arab – scholar who settled in Xining, Qinghai in 1934 to teach the Wahhabi doctrine. This exposure led him to reassess some of his views, although his major intellectual transformation would only come when he departed for the Hajj in 1936, a period during which he spent considerable time at the Salafi Dar Al-Hadith school.

在这一背景下,赛莱菲耶派(受沙特瓦哈比运动影响形成的中国伊斯兰教派别——本刊注),在中国首次明显出现,这基本上是对伊赫瓦尼派(中国伊斯兰教派别——本刊注)“脱离”其原瓦哈比精神而做出的反应。人们通常认为,萨拉菲主义的创始传播者是马德宝(1867—1977年)。他原本是伊赫瓦尼派信徒,在整个西北地区的各清真寺都当过阿訇。他最早接触萨拉菲主义是通过一次拜访。1934年,马德宝拜访了在青海省西宁传授瓦哈比教义的一位到访学者(大概是阿拉伯人)。这一接触使马德宝重新评估了自己的一些看法。不过,他的重大认识转变发生在1936年。当时他去朝觐,在此期间,他在萨拉菲哈迪塞学校花了大量时间学习。

On returning to China in 1937, Ma Debao became an enthusiastic promoter of the teachings, quickly gathering a following of his own centered in the Xinwang mosque in Linxia, Gansu and breaking away in turn from the Yihewani movement, whom he perceived to have compromised their beliefs. His Salafi group encountered strong opposition from the established Yihewani clergy and their warlord backers, forcing the movement to assume a more cautious and quietest attitude towards politics for the sake of its survival.

在1937年返回中国之后,马德宝成为这些教义的狂热信徒,迅速以甘肃临夏的一座清真寺为核心聚集了自己的追随者,随后脱离了伊赫瓦尼运动。他认为该运动已经损害了他们的信仰。他的萨拉菲集团遭到根深蒂固的伊赫瓦尼派神职人员及其军阀支持者的强烈反对,迫使该运动为了生存而对政治抱有更谨慎的态度。

After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Salafis – now unfettered by the Muslim warlords – experienced a brief period of religious growth, with its leadership actively participating in a number of state organs as well as the newly created Islamic Association of China (IAC). This soon came to an end as the 1958 “Religious Reform Campaign,” followed by the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), forced the movement underground as many of its leaders and adherents were killed off or sent to concentration camps. It survived as remnants from the leadership settled in Xinjiang and Tibet during these difficult years.

在中华人民共和国于1949年成立之后,萨拉菲派(现在不再受到穆斯林军阀的束缚)经历了短暂的宗教发展期,其领导层积极参与多个国家机构以及新成立的中国伊斯兰教协会(IAC)。

Channels of Saudi Influence

沙特影响力的渠道

The start of the “Reform and Opening Up” in 1978 signaled the end of a dark period of sustained persecution against China’s Muslim communities, including the Salafis. The dismantlement of restrictions on religious worship, the restoration of mosques, and the reformation of the IAC served to reconsolidate state control over these communities but more significantly, served to showcase (in a resurrection of Chinese foreign policy patterns in the 1950s) Beijing’s tolerance of Islam, a policy principally aimed at courting the support of various Muslim states. The direct outcome of this new “opening” allowed the re-introduction, and even amplification of, Saudi Salafi influences across the country, with implications for both the Salafi and wider Muslim community as a whole. This occurred through various channels, the most important of which was the restoration of the Hajj missions in 1979 (after nearly a decade-long suspension dating from 1964) followed by new regulations allowing private individuals to make the pilgrimage in 1984, that allowed considerable numbers of Hui Muslims – jumping from nearly 2000 in 1985 to nearly 10,000 annually in 1990 – to travel to the Kingdom. There, some of these pilgrims opted to stay for further study or came in touch with relatives from the well-established Chinese Saudi diaspora (which had settled in the Hedjaz following the end of the Chinese civil war and received citizenship there). These interactions exposed Chinese Muslims to new discourses and religious experiences that challenged their own traditional understandings of Islam. They returned to China carrying Wahhabi books, leaflets, fatwas (religious rulings), and sermon tapes that broadly disseminated Salafi ideas.

1978年“改革开放”的启动标志着对中国穆斯林社区(包括萨拉菲派)的宗教崇拜限制取消了,清真寺恢复了,IAC的改革重新巩固了国家对这些社区的控制,但更显著的是,有助于展示北京对伊斯兰教的包容,而该政策的主要目的是团结各伊斯兰国家。开放政策的直接后果是,允许重新引入,甚至是扩大沙特萨拉菲主义在中国整个国家的影响,对萨拉菲派乃至更广泛的穆斯林社区整体都产生了影响。这一切是通过各种渠道产生的,其中最重要的是政府出台了新规定允许个人去沙特朝觐,朝觐在1979年得以恢复。有相当多的回族穆斯林每年去沙特,1985年近2000人,到了1999年达到近万人。还有,一些朝觐者选择留下来继续学习,或者与亲戚建立联系。这些亲戚来自已经在沙特安家落户的中国流散人口(他们在中国内战结束后在赫加齐定居下来,并获得公民身份)。这些互动让中国穆斯林接触到新的话语和宗教体验,从而挑战了他们自己对伊斯兰教的传统理解。他们回到中国时带着瓦哈比教派的书籍、传单、法特瓦(宗教裁决),以及广为传播萨拉菲理念的讲经录像带。

Other significant channels included the arrival of Saudi organizations and preachers in China during the 1980s. Initially, religious activities were limited to influential groups like the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the Muslim World League, and the Islamic Development Bank, which operated under the auspices of the IAC and in turn re-directed their efforts in a non-sectarian fashion. Their activities, beyond providing alternative channels of communication between Saudi and Chinese officials, encompassed the construction of various Islamic Institutes, the renovation of major mosques, the initiation of a Quranic printing and distribution project (in 1987, more than a million copies were disbursed across China as a “royal gift” from the Saudi King), and the provision of training workshops for clerics and scholarships for students (initially in China and Pakistan,) amongst others. By the mid-1980s, religious policies were relaxed considerably, allowing for a growing number of Saudi private organizations and individuals (mainly preachers and missionaries bringing in religious literature) to increasingly work outside established IAC channels. In this new environment, these entities began to selectively target their funding towards specific groups – particularly those visibly identified as Salafi in places like Gansu, Qinhai, Ningxia, Shanxi, and Yunnan – and popularize certain discourses that might have been rejected by the IAC for fear of inviting state reprimand.

其他显著的渠道包括沙特组织和神职人员在上个世纪80年代来到中国。最初,宗教活动仅限于有影响力的集团,如伊斯兰合作组织、世界穆斯林联盟和伊斯兰开发银行等。这些组织都在IAC的羽翼下运作。除了提供沙特与中国官方之间替代性的沟通渠道,他们的活动还涵盖建造各种伊斯兰研究院,装修大清真寺,启动一个《古兰经》印刷和发行项目(在1987年,作为沙特国王的“王室礼物”,一百多万册《古兰经》在中国全国各地免费发放)。他们还为学生提供神职人员的培训讲习班和奖学金(最初是在中国和巴基斯坦),如此等等。到了80年代中期,中国的宗教政策大幅放宽,允许越来越多的沙特私人组织和个人(主要是带来宗教文献的神职人员)越来越多地在IAC渠道之外活动。在这种新的环境下,这些实体开始选择性地将其经费面向特定群体,特别是甘肃、青海、宁夏、陕西和云南地区那些明显被标识为萨拉菲派的群体,普及了IAC由于担心会招致国家谴责而拒绝的某些宗教话语。

The activities of these groups were greatly facilitated by a network of Chinese Salafi activists who had graduated from Saudi or Saudi-affiliated institutions like Imam Saudi University, Umm Al-Qura, and Medina University. While numbers are hard to come by, one study from Medina University shows that between 1961 and 2000/2001, over 652 scholarships were granted to mainland Chinese. Nearly 76 percent of these were offered in the 1980s and 90s alone. While significant numbers of the graduates (who ofter never actually completed their studies) gravitated towards middlemen jobs in Guangzhou or Yiwu where they could utilize their Arabic proficiency, a few joined privately run religious academies in Yunnan or Gansu, and some began officiating in mosques after the longstanding official barriers on the hiring of foreign-trained Imams eased in the 2000s. A smaller but far more influential group fostered close ties with Saudi organizations and preachers – a relationship that was beneficial to both sides.

中国萨拉菲派活动人士组成的网络为这些团体的活动提供了极大的便利。这些活动人士毕业于沙特或者沙特的附属机构,如伊玛目沙特大学和麦地那大学等。虽然数字很难得到,但麦地那大学的一项研究结果表明,在1961年至2000/2001年间,沙特向中国大陆652人提供了奖学金。这些人中近76%是在20世纪80年代和90年代拿到奖学金的。不过,相当数量的毕业生(从来没有真正完成学业)被广州和义乌的中间商的工作所吸引,因为他们可以利用自己的阿拉伯语水平。少数人加入了云南和甘肃省由私人经营的宗教院校。在21世纪头十年,中国放松了对雇用受外国培训的伊玛目的长期官方障碍之后,有的人开始主理清真寺。一个较小但更有影响力的组织与沙特组织和神职人员建立了密切的联系——这一关系对双方都有利。

The Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, which came under a U.S.-backed UN ban in 2004 due to its presumed affiliations with Al-Qaeda, is illustrative. Throughout the 1990s, the organization expended considerable funds on the construction of Salafi mosques across China, the maintenance of Salafi-aligned schools (typically “Arabic language” schools that double as Islamic institutions), and the provision of scholarships for interested students – an array of activities that were largely overseen by various (at times competing) circles of Medina University graduates who leveraged their influence within the wider community.

哈拉曼伊斯兰基金会就很能说明问题。由于据推测与“基地”组织有关系,联合国在美国的支持下在2004年取缔了它。在整个20世纪90年代,该组织花费大量资金在中国各地建造萨拉菲派清真寺,赞助与萨拉菲派结盟的学校(通常是兼作伊斯兰机构的“阿拉伯语”学校),以及向感兴趣的学生提供奖学金。一连串的活动基本上受到各种(有时候是相互竞争的)麦地那大学毕业生圈的监督,这些毕业生在更广泛的社区范围内发挥自己的影响力。

In conjunction with these developments, Beijing had assumed a more cautious attitude by the 1990s, typified by the barring of entry of suspected preachers, continued refusal to offer scholarships for students heading to Saudi Arabia, and the introduction of new laws that restricted foreign religious activities, including one in 1994 that banned donations made outside the auspices of the IAC. Unsurprisingly, these restrictions have grown more stringent over the last decade, but they have not severed the Saudi ties altogether.

在这些发展的同时,北京也在上个世纪90年代采取了更审慎的态度。不出所料,这些限制在过去10年间变得更加严格,但是它们并没有完全切断与沙特的关系。

The Saudi Impact

沙特的影响

Saudi influences have had a somewhat contradictory impact on Hui Salafis and the wider Muslim community in China. On one level, these influences have contributed – to a degree – to the salafisation (namely, a cultural and religious approximation of an “idealized” Saudi orthodoxy) of Hui Muslim society. This salafisation subsumes the adoption of presumably Salafi doctrines, prayers rituals, attitudes, and even culturally authentic attire (the Saudi headgear worn in a manner usually associated with the religiously conservative in the Kingdom) and mosque architecture under what can be described as an Arabization process, although the appearance of these trends is not always indicative of a Salafi influence. The salafisation of Hui Muslims has affected nearly all sects, albeit in different ways. Amongst Salafis, the re-introduction of orthodox sources after a significant period of isolation, and amplified now by globalizing forces, led to the breakdown of the old Salafi community as a new generation of Salafis (the early graduates and pilgrims) in the 1980s sought to “correct” the errors of their elders. This was reflected in the schism that emerged over the interpretation of certain Quranic verses, the appearance of a more activist opposition to Sufism leading to the demolishment of some Sufi tombs in the Northwest, and the enunciation of a takfeeri (excommunicatory) stance towards “deviant” Salafis and non-Salafi Muslims that led to bouts of sectarian infighting. Beyond the Salafis, salafisation is also observable amongst Yihewani and Gedimu (“old” traditional) Muslims who, in many cases, while not describing themselves necessarily as Salafis (due to fears of ostracization or out of a fidelity towards the Hanafi madhab), embraced aspects of this intellectual tradition. In the Yihewani case, it is marked by a revived interest in the Wahhabi origins of the movement.

沙特对中国的回族萨拉菲派和较广泛的穆斯林社区产生了有点矛盾的影响。在一个层面上,这些影响在一定程度上促成了回族穆斯林社会的“萨拉菲化”(即,在文化上和宗教上接受“理想化的”沙特正统)。这种萨拉菲化包括采纳萨拉菲主义、祷告礼仪、态度,甚至是文化上而言真正的装束(戴沙特头巾通常与这个王国的宗教保守有关),清真寺的建造也可以被描述成阿拉伯化进程,尽管这些趋势的出现并不总是表明萨拉菲派的影响。回族穆斯林的萨拉菲化已经影响到几乎所有的派别,虽然方式不同。在萨拉菲派当中,在相当长的隔离期之后重新引进正统源,现在又由于全球化的力量而放大,导致了旧萨拉菲社区的解体,因为20世纪80年代的新一代萨拉菲派(早期的毕业生和朝觐者)谋求“纠正”长辈的错误。这主要表现在对《古兰经》某些经文的解释出现了分裂,苏菲派遭到激进人士的反对,对“离经叛道的”萨拉菲派和非萨拉菲派穆斯林的驱逐导致教派明争暗斗。除了萨拉菲派,在伊赫瓦尼派和“古老”的传统穆斯林当中也可以观察到萨拉菲化。在很多情况下,这些人不一定将自己描述成萨拉菲派(因为担心会遭到驱逐或者出于对哈乃斐教法学派的忠诚),但他们接受这种思想传统的各个方面。在伊赫瓦尼派,他们对这一运动的瓦哈比起源重新点燃了兴趣。

On another level, Saudi influences have, counterintuitively, encouraged a fragmentation of the Salafi community within China. This has been driven of two factors: First, the introduction of new sources of funding and ideas brought by Saudi organizations, preachers, and affiliated graduates led to the proliferation of new “mosque communities” or jama’at amongst Salafis, a development that was principally shaped by the leadership struggles that assumed an intergenerational character. Second, Salafis – like other sects – were not exposed to homogenous discourses on Islam or Salafism, mainly because of existing cultural and linguistic barriers, and the multiplicity of doctrines and agendas pursued by various organizations and preachers, which have induced a splintering effect along doctrinal and ritualistic lines within the Salafi community, even if less pronounced than elsewhere in the Islamic World.

在另一个层面上,沙特的影响反而促进了中国境内萨拉菲社区的分裂。这是由两个因素驱动的:首先,沙特组织、神职人员和相关毕业生带来了新的经费和思想,造成新的“清真寺社区”或者萨拉菲派寺坊的激增,这种发展主要是由领导权的争斗所塑造的。其次,萨拉菲派像其他派别一样,没有接触到对伊斯兰教或者萨拉菲主义的本土阐释,这主要是因为现有的文化和语言障碍,以及各种组织和神职人员追求多样化的理论和议程。

Indeed, the most significant outcome of these two simultaneous developments is that it has helped give way to the formation of what can be called a “Salafism with Chinese characteristics.” Its proponents – mainly from the 1990s generation, are charting new discourses about Salafism that deviate from that which exists in the Saudi mainstream. Most notably, there is a strong rejection of sectarianism (although there is a troubling growth in anti-Shia sentiment) and an emphasis on ecumenical approaches – a shift that stems principally from what many view as the takfeeri legacy of the 1980s that led to unnecessary confrontations with the wider Muslim community. Indeed, the Salafis today encounter severe challenges in proselytize and even practicing in places like Xining, Qinghai.

事实上,这两个同时发展的局势的最显著结果是,它有助于“中国特色萨拉菲主义”的构成。其支持者——主要来自20世纪90年代的一代人——正在绘制关于偏离沙特主流萨拉菲主义的新话语。最值得注意的是,他们强烈反对宗派主义(虽然反什叶派情绪令人不安地在增大),并强调合一做法——这一转变主要源于来自许多人所认为的20世纪80年代的驱逐出教的做法。这种做法导致与更广泛的穆斯林社区发生不必要的冲突。事实上,萨拉菲派如今在劝诱改宗方面遇到了严峻的挑战,甚至是在西宁和青海等地。

The post-90s generation is also far more internationalist and, to a large extent, far more cognizant of the realities facing Hui Muslims within the Chinese state (as a minority of a minority contending with the attention of the state security apparatus). While courting Saudi funding and literature, it is selective in what discourses it seeks to reproduce. This explains why some Saudi-oriented Salafis are increasingly discouraging visits by Saudi preachers, who are unable to appreciate the specificities of Chinese Islam there. More importantly, this new generation is more willing to cooperate with the authorities, and is displaying signs of seeking to participate more actively within the political channels that have been traditionally dominated by Sufi and Yihewani groups.

90后一代人也更加国际主义。在很大程度上,他们更加认识到中国境内回族穆斯林面临的现状——作为少数民族中的少数引起国家的注意。虽然想求得沙特的资金和知识,他们在话语方面还是具有选择性。正因如此,一些有沙特倾向的萨拉菲派日益拒绝沙特神职人员的到访,因为这些人不能够理解中国伊斯兰教的特殊性。更重要的是,新一代更愿意与政府合作。他们显示的迹象表明,他们正谋求更加积极地参与历来由苏菲派和伊赫瓦尼派群体占主导地位的政治渠道。

In all, the Hui Salafi scene and its connections to Saudi Arabia are complex. The community is fragmenting intellectually and generating new discourses that reflect the tensions that confront new religious authorities and groups seeking to navigate the difficult waters between perceived orthodoxy and the realities of their situation. Hui Salafis want to carve out a space of their own within China. Their concerns are not political per se: Across the spectrum, they appear to have embraced the apolitical quietism one expects to see within the Saudi clerical establishment. Even with regards to the Uighur Salafis – if we speak in terms of an Islamic political project – there is little evidence to suggest a burgeoning solidarity between the two groups. Historical hatreds notwithstanding, the evolution of Uighur Salafism has taken a completely different trajectory than that of the Hui and its political/religious dynamics are therefore different. Rather, for the majority of Hui Salafis, their concerns remain solely those of identity and religious legitimization.

总之,回族萨拉菲派及其与沙特的联系十分复杂。该社区在知识方面四分五裂,创造的新话语反映出新宗教机构和团体在谋求所谓的正统和现状之间艰难导航时面临着紧张局势。回族萨拉菲派想在中国境内开拓出自己的空间。他们的担忧不是政治本身:在整个频谱,他们似乎已经接受了人们预计在沙特神职层面看到的非政治性清静无为。即使在维吾尔族的萨拉菲派方面,也几乎没有证据表明,这两个群体之间新出现了团结。尽管有宿仇,维吾尔族萨拉菲主义的发展采取了跟回族完全不同的轨迹,其政治/宗教动态因此也是不同的。相反,对于绝大多数回族萨拉菲派,他们的担忧依然仅存在于认同和宗教合法性的问题上。

Mohammed Al-Sudairi is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar (International Politics). He spent two years in Beijing studying Chinese and undertaking freelance research.

穆罕穆德 •苏得里毕业于美国乔治敦大学外交学院卡塔尔分校(国际政治专业),曾在北京学习中文并从事自由研究工作,为期两年。

镜像链接:谷歌镜像 | 亚马逊镜像

分类: 新闻, 译者系列 标签:
  1. 不民主不統一
    2016年5月22日01:49 | #1

    全球伊斯蘭恐怖主義的大本營,就是沙特

  2. 匿名
    2016年5月22日10:43 | #2

    共产党为了永久剥削屁民,跟穆斯林合作不奇怪,本来就没有合法性。只是中国人更不幸了,第二次同治回乱两千万打不住,估计屁民要死一亿。——deng9

  3. Mobile Guest
    2016年5月22日04:53 | #3

    大儒教几千年来也不是吃素的。

  4. 匿名
    2016年5月22日14:31 | #4

    “新一代谋求参与政治渠道。” ———— 没错,这就是支那文网络上反穆的根源。

    支那人有一种特性,就是只要自己没有投身于残酷的反抗事业,就会本能地反感一切谋求参与政治渠道的抗争者。

    大多数偶然听说过反抗事业的支那人,会跟在自甘五屁股后头学舌骂“民逗”。

    少数过了这个坎儿的支那人,在穆斯林这个新坎儿前面又塌了脚。

    不相信的,你去看看屠夫等真的投身反抗事业,为此投入巨大的财力精力,乃至付出自己与家人安全为代价的,那些真正的反抗者们,他们啥时候关心过什么”绿绿夺权”的问题???

  5. fx
    2016年5月22日15:24 | #5

    反穆至少现在不明显,但恐穆是绝对存在的,毕竟沙特和IS的现实摆在那儿。深圳5000万的清真寺和基督教家庭教会被取缔的新闻几乎是同时出现的,不管是否是被迫或自愿,和政治越走越近是不争事实。我至今都无法忘记浏览第一届迪拜艺术博览会上的作品带给我的震撼,那是一个令人耳目一新的中东,但这种改变在国内几乎体会不到。

  6. 匿名
    2016年5月22日16:00 | #6

    @匿名

    穆斯林撒谎是不是已经成为习惯了?非穆反感一切谋求参与政治渠道的抗争者?穆斯林所谓的抗争是屠戮更为弱小的非穆吧,你们所谓的抗争什么时候针对过赵家人?还有,你们所有的抗争,目的不就是奴役非穆,建立伊斯兰神权国家么?还抗争?穆斯林是要毁了所有美好的词汇吧,就跟共产党毁了“同志”、“小姐”词汇一样。——deng9

  7. 匿名
    2016年5月22日16:09 | #7

    @匿名
    傻逼回回,学习了汉文,就装日本人了。你看看你的肤色,面容跟汉人有区别吗?因为你的祖宗就是汉人。经过上千年的混血,你的基因里有几个碱基是阿拉伯人的?你的血统就是汉人的,还反汉人, 你们咋不先把自己都给弄死?这样也好进行内部净化,消除你们的汉人基因。

  8. 自由民
    2016年5月22日22:05 | #8

    支持穆斯林,你們這群豬只會打壓自由民主

  9. 匿名
    2016年5月22日23:52 | #9

    匿名 :
    @匿名
    傻逼回回,学习了汉文,就装日本人了。你看看你的肤色,面容跟汉人有区别吗?因为你的祖宗就是汉人。经过上千年的混血,你的基因里有几个碱基是阿拉伯人的?你的血统就是汉人的,还反汉人, 你们咋不先把自己都给弄死?这样也好进行内部净化,消除你们的汉人基因。

    傻逼,全地球的人类绝大多数基因与非洲智人完全相同。你以为人家信仰跟你不同就认为人家和你不是一个物种就该死,那你和他们一样都是傻逼。

  10. 匿名
    2016年5月23日06:56 | #10

    @匿名

    错了,杀杀人犯跟杀人是两个不同的概念,一个正义,一个非正义。——deng9

  11. 匿名
    2016年5月23日13:16 | #11

    给统治阶级提供个思路:团结的力量是伟大的,所以削弱的方法就是不团结,伊斯兰不是也有很多流派么,然后你懂的。

  12. 匿名
    2016年5月24日07:19 | #12

    @匿名

    这是穆斯林暗藏祸心的建议吧,伊斯兰有再多的流派,在杀死异教徒这一点上都是一致的。在异教徒没灭绝之前,伊斯兰都是一致对外,异教徒灭绝之后各个流派才会争谁是真正的穆斯林。何况从权术的角度来说,引入第三方甚至第n方互斗都是在自己羸弱不堪情况下的不得已。中国现在不需要这样的做法。——deng9

  13. 匿名
    2016年5月24日07:21 | #13

    中国真正要做的,就是打破伊斯兰教的党支部建在连上的组织形式,不能让阿訇有条件组织穆斯林。——deng9

  1. 本文目前尚无任何 trackbacks 和 pingbacks.